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ABSTRACT 
 
Cross-Border Mergers and Acquisitions (CBMAs) are one of the vehicles for Foreign 
Direct Investment (FDI) and remain a popular external growth strategies by firms 
worldwide. However, World Investment Report 2015 (UNCTAD, 2015) reports a slight 
decrease of 16% in global FDI for year 2014. Nevertheless, FDI inflow to emerging 
economies especially the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) member 
countries increase by 5%. With the intensity of CBMAs in ASEAN member countries, this 
paper reviews the six ASEAN member countries which actively involved in CBMAs from 
January 2002 to December 2014. Discussion is also centered on how the main research 
stream on CBMAs (antecedents, impact of CBMA and determinants of firm performance) 
relates to CBMA trends by ASEAN member countries. Corporate governance spillover 
hypothesis is anticipated to explain the CBMA motivations of the ASEAN firms and also 
the variation in ASEAN firms' performance following CBMAs.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Cross-Border Merger and Acquisition (CBMA) is defined as the transactions that 
involve at least two firms (Chen & Findlay, 2003; Reddy, 2012) which belongs to 
two different economies (Chen & Findlay, 2003), nations or home countries 
(Reddy, 2012) and transactions that span national borders (Hopkins, 1999). It is 
also obvious that CBMAs are considered a vehicle of FDI (Ahouansou, 2010; 
Alba, Park, & Wang, 2009; Hopkins, 1999; Mody & Negishi, 2000; Nicolas, 
Santis, & Aviat, 2009; Wang & Wong, 2009; Yang, 2015; Zhu & Jog, 2012) due 
to the fact that CBMAs are involved in investments in foreign countries and 
instigated the transfer of control or ownership from local to foreign entities (Chen 
& Findlay, 2003; Wang & Wong, 2009). 
 
 According to World Investment Report 2015 (UNCTAD, 2015), there is 
a 16%  reduction in global FDI in 2014 ($1.23 trillion) from year 2013 ($1.47 
trillion). Nevertheless FDI inflow to emerging economies increased specifically 
driven by the emerging Asian countries, whilst the flow to Latin America 
recorded a reduction and to Africa remained stagnant. This statistic is consistent 
with Jongwanich, Brooks and Kohpaiboon (2013) who claimed that CBMAs 
from emerging countries mostly originated from Asian nation. In addition, 
UNCTAD (2015) also highlighted that global decline in FDI inflow is affected by 
regional grouping countries discussing the Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership (TTIP) and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), with the exception 
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and Regional 
Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). In addition, FDI outflow from 
emerging Asian economies recorded an increased in year 2014 with 31% of these 
increase being from East and Southeast Asia.  
 
 The recent FDI trends by ASEAN member countries support the 
contention made by Metwalli and Tang (2009) that CBMA expansion in 
Southeast Asia would continue following numerous bilateral and regional free 
trade agreements involving ASEAN countries. UNCTAD (2015) also anticipate 
that regional integration in Asia would continue through ASEAN and positively 
affect the FDI involving the member countries. Consistent with UNCTAD World 
Investment Report (UNCTAD, 2015), Figure 1 showed an increased in CBMA 
activities among ASEAN member countries from year 2013 to 2014. The CBMA 
transaction number increased by 13% while the value increased by 87%.  
 
As portrayed in Figure 2, the most active CBMA players among ASEAN 
member countries are Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, Vietnam and 
Philippines. These countries are also top six countries with the highest market 
capitalisation in Southeast Asia (Quandl, 2012). 
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With rapid increase in CBMAs involving ASEAN member countries, it 
is of high interest to look at the CBMAs involving these countries. This is due to 
the fact that existing studies either examined CBMA literature involving 
emerging countries in general (Lebedev, Peng, Xie, & Stevens, 2015) or provide 
a review of CBMAs transaction involving Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation 
(APEC) countries (Chen & Findlay, 2003). However, the unique composition of 
ASEAN countries with different level of market development i.e., developed 
(Singapore), emerging (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand) and frontier 
(Vietnam), preclude the applicability of specific CBMA literature from either 
developed or emerging countries. In addition, the countries in this region have 
different investment pull factor such as high rank in term of infrastructure quality 
(Singapore), ongoing FDI liberalisation (Indonesia) and low labour cost 
advantage (Vietnam) (UNCTAD, 2015). Using Thomson One Banker database, 
this paper provides further insight by not only reviewing CBMA trends involving 
ASEAN member countries but also how the CBMA trends of ASEAN member 
countries can be used to anticipate CBMA antecedents and determinants of firms' 
performance unique to ASEAN member countries. 
  
 
 
 
Figure 1. CBMA involving ASEAN member countries 
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Figure 2. Percentage of CBMA transactions of ASEAN member countries, 2002 to 2014 
 
 
OVERVIEW OF CBMA BY SIX TOP ASEAN COUNTRY PLAYERS 
(BOTH TARGET AND BIDDING FIRMS) 
 
According to Figure 3, the number of CBMA transactions of six top ASEAN 
CBMA players steadily increased from year 2002 to 2008. From 2010 onwards, 
the number of transactions continuously declined except for year 2014 where the 
transactions number rose. Figure 4 shows the transaction value (US$'million) of 
CBMAs in six ASEAN countries. Transaction numbers dropped slightly in year 
2009, and the transaction value however declined tremendously especially for 
ASEAN bidding firm, from US$43.9 billion in 2008 to US$5 billion in 2009.  
 
 
 
Figure 3. CBMAs of six ASEAN member countries, 2002 to 2014 (Number of 
transaction) 
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Figure 4 also highlighted that the highest CBMA value for ASEAN 
target firms occurred in year 2012, and as shown in Table 1, four out of top ten 
CBMA were from year 2012. The highest CBMA value of ASEAN target firm 
was US$6.8 billion, from the acquisition of Singaporean firm Fraser & Neave Ltd 
by TCC Assets Ltd. Meanwhile, for the CBMA of ASEAN bidding firm, year 
2007 recorded the highest CBMA value which was US$45.6 billion. This was 
explained by Table 2 whereby three CBMA transactions of year 2007 ranked the 
highest among top ten CBMA of ASEAN bidding firm. With regard to the 
specific country, CBMA transactions of Singaporean firms occupied most of the 
top ten ranking both as target and bidder. 
 
As indicated in Table 3, Singapore and Indonesia are top two target 
nations in ASEAN. Consistent with Table 3, Figure 5 showed that Singapore was 
the most popular target country from year 2002 to year 2008. In year 2009, all 
ASEAN target countries have lower CBMAs except for Indonesia and Vietnam. 
Indonesian firms became the most popular target countries in CBMAs from year 
2009 until year 2012. Similarly, the popularity of Vietnamese firms as targets in 
CBMAs increased from being the least targeted firm in year 2002 to 2006, to 
being the third highest targeted firms in year 2009. 
 
 
 
Figure 4. CBMAs in six ASEAN member countries, 2002 to 2014  
(Transaction value in US$' million) 
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Table 1  
Top 10 CBMAs by value of transaction (ASEAN target firms) 
 
 
 
Table 3 also indicated that top bidders of ASEAN target firms were from 
Singapore and Malaysia. In addition, ASEAN target firms has become a popular 
target among developed countries such as Japan, the United States and Australia. 
The top bidders of ASEAN target firms were from financial industry which 
comprised of companies involved in investment, banks, insurance and personal 
credit institution. Other top bidders were from the industrial and material 
industries. 
 
Table 4 shows the summary of CBMA of ASEAN bidding firms. 
Singaporean firms were not only popular target, but also the most active bidder 
among other ASEAN firms as indicated by Figure 6. Even though Indonesian 
firms were the second most popular ASEAN target firms, they were not active 
CBMA bidders with only 128 transactions originating from it. Malaysian firms, 
being the third popular CBMA target ranked second active ASEAN CBMA 
bidders with 1,309 transactions, followed by Thailand and the Philippines. 
However, after year 2005, there seems a downward trend for CBMA by 
Malaysian bidding firms. Even though Vietnam seem quite a popular CBMA 
target country as shown in Figure 5, Vietnamese firms were the least active 
CBMA bidders with a maximum of only five acquisitions in year 2008. Majority 
of CBMAs by ASEAN bidding firms targeted firms from countries in Southeast 
Asia such as Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand. Similar to CBMA of 
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ASEAN target firm, ASEAN bidding firms acquired target from financial, 
industrial and material industries. 
 
Table 2  
Top 10 CBMAs by value of transaction (ASEAN bidding firms) 
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Table 3  
Summary of CBMAs by country (ASEAN target firms) 
 
Nationality 
of Target 
Firms 
N 
Value of Transaction (US$' million) Top 5 Bidder 
Nation 
Top 5 Bidder 
Industries Total Min Max 
Indonesia 1,041 47,497.58 0.002 2,336.02 Singapore 
Malaysia 
Japan 
Australia 
United Kingdom 
Financials 
 Materials 
 Energy and Power 
 Industrials 
 Consumer Staples 
Malaysia 861 35,141.81 0.013 3,049.99 Singapore 
Japan 
Hong Kong 
United States 
United Kingdom 
Financials 
 Industrials 
 Materials 
 High Technology 
 Consumer Staples 
Philippines 329 18,656.14 0.001 3,420.00 United States 
Singapore 
Japan 
Australia 
Hong Kong 
Financials 
 Materials 
 High Technology 
 Energy and Power 
 Industrials 
Singapore 1,311 87,227.70 0.002 6,896.48 Malaysia 
United States 
Hong Kong 
Japan 
Australia 
Financials 
 High Technology 
 Industrials 
 Materials 
 Consumer Products 
and Services 
Thailand 608 21,306.26 0.010 5,315.45 Singapore 
Japan 
Malaysia 
United States 
Hong Kong 
Financials 
 Industrials 
 Materials 
 High Technology 
 Consumer Products 
and Services 
Vietnam 465 9,593.84 0.003 1,290.00 Japan 
Singapore 
United States 
Malaysia 
United Kingdom 
Financials 
 Materials 
 Consumer Staples 
 Industrials 
 Energy and Power 
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Table 4  
Summary of CBMAs by country (ASEAN bidding firms) 
 
Nationality 
of Bidding 
Firm 
N 
Value of Transaction (US$' million) Top 5 Target 
Nation 
Top 5 Target 
Industries Total Min Max 
Indonesia 128 9,994.84 0.05 2,000.00 Singapore 
Australia 
Malaysia 
China 
British 
Virgin 
Materials 
 Energy and Power 
 Financials 
 Consumer Staples 
 Industrials 
Malaysia 1,309 52,115.86 0.001 2,489.23 Singapore 
Hong Kong 
Indonesia 
Australia 
Thailand 
Financials 
 Industrials 
 Materials 
 High Technology 
 Energy and Power 
Philippines 132 5,634.92 0.021 1,453.08 United 
States 
United 
Kingdom 
Australia 
Hong Kong 
China 
Energy and Power 
 Materials 
 Financials 
 Consumer Staples 
 Retail 
Singapore 2,886 200,009.60 0.001 14,284.17 China 
Malaysia 
Indonesia 
Hong Kong 
Australia 
Industrials 
 Financials 
 High Technology 
 Materials 
 Real Estate 
Thailand 238 26,939.68 0.023 9,385.93 Singapore 
China 
Vietnam 
Indonesia 
United 
States 
Materials 
 Consumer Staples 
 Energy and Power 
 Industrials 
 Financials 
Vietnam 28 373.56 0.907 246.97 United 
States 
Peru 
Australia 
China 
Russian Fed 
Energy and Power 
Materials 
High Technology 
Industrials 
Telecommunications 
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Figure 5. The CBMA trends from year 2002 to 2014 (ASEAN target firms) 
 
 
 
Figure 6. The CBMA trends from year 2002 to 2014 (ASEAN bidding firms) 
 
 Figure 7 showed that private firms were the highest being targeted in 
ASEAN CBMAs. This is consistent with Chari, Ouimet and Tesar (2010) who 
claimed that emerging market targets were more likely to be private as compared 
with developed market targets. In contrast, ASEAN bidding firms were from 
subsidiary and public type of firms. There was minimal involvement of 
government owned firm in CBMAs. This phenomenon is consistent with the 
contention made by Chen, Huang and Chen (2009) that state owned firms were 
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less likely to be involved in CBMAs due to the risk of reduced control in such 
firms once the mergers materialised.  
 
 
 
Figure 7. Listing status of firms involved in CBMAs 
 
 Figure 8 shows the structure of consideration paid during CBMA 
transactions. The highest number of consideration structure received by ASEAN 
target firms was by "Others". Others comprised of payment using asset, 
convertible and etc. ASEAN target firms second highest consideration structure 
was cash and least paid by shares or combination of cash and stock (hybrid). 
ASEAN bidder preferred payment by cash for their CBMA transactions. Similar 
to ASEAN target firm, the least preferred payment structure by ASEAN bidder 
were shares and hybrid.  
 
As shown in Figure 9, 2,467 transactions (53%) of ASEAN target firms 
were acquired by firms from similar industries and 47% by firms from different 
industries. Contrary to ASEAN target firm, ASEAN bidder preferred diversified 
acquisition (2,499 transactions or 53%) than related acquisition (47%). 
 
Table 5 shows the premium paid or received during CBMA transactions. 
On average, the Philippines bidders paid the highest premium for their CBMA 
targets while Vietnam bidders paid the lowest. In contrast, Philippines target 
firms received the lowest premium from their bidders. Singaporean target firms 
received the highest premium compared to its ASEAN target counterparts. In 
fact, one of the Singaporean target firms (Forterra Trust) received the highest 
premium from a Chinese bidder (New Precise Holdings Ltd) in year 2013. 
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Figure 8. The structure of consideration paid/ received during CBMA transaction 
  
 
 
Figure 9. Diversified or related acquisition 
  
Typically, ASEAN bidders acquired firms with poor performance during 
CBMAs. As shown in Table 6, four out of six ASEAN countries acquired target 
firms with negative return on asset. On the other hand, ASEAN target firms were 
better performers.  
 
 Panel A of Table 7 indicated that almost half of CBMAs (1,953 or 46%) 
by ASEAN bidding firms resulted in full acquisition with only 350 or 18% of the 
firms already having control in foreign targets. The remaining ASEAN bidders 
did not have any interest in target firms before CBMAs (82%). 
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Table 5  
Premium paid and received during CBMA transactions 
 
Nationality 
of Firm N 
Premium paid by ASEAN 
bidding firm N 
Premium received by ASEAN 
target firm 
Average Min Max Average Min Max 
Indonesia 12 27.54 –84.62 111.5 95 19.59 –94.79 532.11 
Malaysia 66 11.69 –74.65 200.01 76 17.37 –89.13 225.13 
Philippines 20 29.76 –17.28 98.75 28 5.11 –80.79 150.00 
Singapore 286 16.43 –94.79 622.54 164 24.19 –88.81 785.95 
Thailand 22 19.35 –30.55 91.43 84 11.83 –49.66 566.67 
Vietnam 1 4.29 4.29 4.29 17 10.46 –25.58 75.44 
 
Table 6  
Target Return on Assets (ROA)  
 
 
 
Similarly, Panel B of Table 7 showed that 1,726 or 41% of ASEAN target firms 
that were acquired by foreign firms resulted in full acquisition following the 
transactions. 1,416 or 82% of the bidders did not have any interest in ASEAN 
firms prior to the acquisitions and only 314 or 18% of the bidders already have 
control. Only 214 of the acquisitions resulted in portfolio investment (5%) for the 
ASEAN CBMA targets. 
 
 The following sections will discuss on how the main research stream of 
CBMAs (antecedents, impact and determinants of firm performance) relating to 
CBMA trends within the ASEAN member countries. 
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Table 7  
Percentage of Shares Owned Before and After CBMAs 
 
Panel A : ASEAN bidding firms 
% of Shares Owned After 
Transaction 
All 
Sample 
Interest before 
acquisition Pre-acquisition Interest 
N No Yes < 20% 20 to 40% 
> 40 to 
<50% 
50% 
and > 
Portfolio Investment 
(<10%) 225 212 13 13 0 0 0 
Minority Acquisition 
(10%–49%) 1,030 862 168 102 62 4 0 
Majority Acquisition  
(50%– 99%) 1,056 724 332 21 57 43 211 
Full Acquisition (100%) 1,953 1,603 350 18 30 19 283 
Total 4264 3401 863 154 149 66 494 
Panel B : ASEAN target firms 
% of Shares Owned After 
Transaction 
All 
Sample 
Interest before 
acquisition Pre-acquisition Interest 
N No Yes < 20% 20 to 40% 
> 40 to 
<50% 
50% 
and > 
Portfolio Investment 
(<10%) 214 208 6 6 0 0 0 
Minority Acquisition 
(10%–49%) 1,115 944 175 86 77 8 0 
Majority Acquisition 
(50%–99%) 1,089 729 366 21 88 44 207 
Full Acquisition (100%) 1,726 1,416 314 13 33 23 241 
Total 4144 3297 861 126 198 75 448 
 
 
ANTECEDENTS (MOTIVATIONS) FOR CROSS-BORDER MERGERS 
AND ACQUISITIONS (CBMAs) 
 
Firm-Specific Factors 
 
Many studies examined the antecedents or characteristics of firms or countries 
that were highly involved in CBMAs. Studies by Gonzalez, Vasconcellos, Kish 
and Kramer (1997), Martynova and Renneboog (2008), Alba et al. (2009), Chen 
et al. (2009) and Popli & Sinha (2014) indicated that larger firms tend to be a 
bidder in CBMAs as compared with smaller size firms. This is due to the fact that 
a large firm normally has strong market presence (Popli & Sinha, 2014) and less 
likely to experience financial constraints (Alba et al., 2009; Chen et al., 2009). 
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Likewise, Gonzalez et al. (1997) found that target firms in CBMAs tend to be 
smaller firms because smaller firms are associated with having lower risk for the 
fund invested during CBMAs. However, some studies reported that larger target 
size associated with high probability of being acquired by foreign firms (Ferreira, 
Massa, & Matos, 2010; Martynova & Renneboog, 2008). 
 
 Studies have acknowledged that firms with financial advantage have 
higher tendency to be bidder in CBMAs (Datta, Musteen, & Herrmann, 2009; 
Gonzalez et al., 1997; Popli & Sinha, 2014) as compared with firms with 
financial constraints (Alba et al., 2009; Chen et al., 2009). In addition, it is also 
important for a target firm to have financial advantage (Gonzalez et al., 1997). 
For instance, bidders were interested in target with high liquidity and low debt to 
utilise the high debt capacity in reducing their acquisition cost. In addition, target 
with strong financial performance would attract foreign bidders especially if they 
are from countries with weak corporate governance standards and this 
phenomenon is labelled as "cherry-picking" (Kim & Lu, 2013; Lebedev et al., 
2015). Kim and Lu (2013) argued that picking a better performing target is 
important to gain synergies during CBMAs because relevant local information 
are difficult to obtain in weak governance country.  
 
 Ownership factor is also an important antecedents of CBMAs. Ferreira et 
al. (2010) reported that the foreign institutional ownership was positively 
associated with the intensity of CBMAs (for both bidder and target) because they 
acted as facilitators in CBMAs by reducing information assymmetry between 
bidding and target firms through acting as middle parties in the transaction. 
Ferreira et al. (2010) also claimed that domestic institutional ownership 
negatively affected the probability of being targeted in CBMAs. Meanwhile, 
Chen et al. (2009) asserted that if a firm is owned by a family or state, it has 
lower probability to be involved in CBMAs as bidder because they were afraid of 
losing their management control. 
 
 The characteristic of top management or a firm's internal governance 
measure also played a role in CBMAs. Two studies proposed that board diversity 
in terms of tenure (Barkema & Shvyrkov, 2007) and nationality (Caligiuri, 
Lazarova, & Zehetbauer, 2004) increased the likelihood of CBMA because the 
more diverse a board, the wider the skills, point of view, cultural capital and also 
information held by the top management, thus encourage strategic innovation 
such as CBMAs. Another study by Datta et al. (2009) considered the percentage 
of outside director, non-duality of top management, higher equity ownership of 
manager and the compensation package that linked to long-term performance, 
have positive impact to CBMA intensity. The reason was that all characteristics 
mentioned above help to allign the interest of managers and shareholders, thus 
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reduced the agency cost (risk-averse behaviour) and the managers would be more 
willing to undertake CBMA which is riskier than domestic M&As. 
 
 A study by Harris and Ravenscraft (1991) highlighted that the type of 
industries (R&D intensive industry) increased the probability of a firm to be 
involved in CBMAs. This is due to the fact that the asset of this industry (license 
of specialised knowledge or patent) is not easily transferable especially if there is 
national border issues and also due to possibility to distribute high fixed cost of 
R&D over a number of national market. Mody and Negishi (2000) argued that 
CBMA activity has occurred primarily in the most distressed industry (non-
tradable sectors) thus, well performing industry are less involved in CBMAs. 
Another study found that CBMAs occurred more frequently in the 
manufacturing, mining and services industries (Ahouansou, 2010).  
 
 Based on organisational learning theory, previous overseas experience 
provide a good basis for a firm to expand overseas because it induced the 
development of experience and organisational routine. Consequently, it 
facilitated firm to adopt opportunities such as CBMAs faster than the competitor. 
Previous study by Harris and Ravenscraft (1991) found that 52% of US firms that 
involved in CBMA have operations in the US. Moreover, recent study by Ferreira 
et al. (2010), Popli and Sinha (2014), Lebedev et al. (2015) and Deng and Yang 
(2015) supported the fact that overseas experience is seen as advantageous to 
increase the probability of being involved in CBMAs. 
 
Country-Specific Factors 
 
The country's characteristics were also significant antecendent towards the 
intensity of CBMAs. The most widely studied country-specific antecedent are the 
country's economic development. Numerous studies (Datta et al., 2009; Deng & 
Yang, 2015; Ferreira et al., 2010; Martynova & Renneboog, 2008) recognised the 
importance of target country economic development in attracting foreign bidders. 
This was due to willingness of bidders to take more risky mode of entry (CBMAs 
rather than joint venture) when they entered a developed foreign market (Datta et 
al., 2009) and more purchasing potential created by large financial market (Deng 
& Yang, 2015).  
 
 However, Hur, Parinduri and Riyanto (2011) claimed that bidding 
country economic development was more vital for CBMAs than the economic 
development of the target country. Thus, several studies examined the impact of 
the bidding country economic development on CBMAs. For instance, Chen et al. 
(2009) and Jongwanich et al. (2013) suggested that better developed stock market 
of bidding country increased the intensity of CBMAs by firms from the country 
as the firms have better access to external financing. Deng and Yang (2015) also 
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found that emerging market firms were more likely to undertake CBMAs when 
their home country financial market size is large. Nevertheless, Martynova and 
Renneboog (2008) asserted that bidder will expand their business through 
CBMAs when their home country offer poor investment environment (low 
economic growth).  
 
 Another country-specific antecedent is the regulatory environment of the 
country. Privatisation of firms in host country postively affected the CBMAs 
inflow to countries such as Mexico and Chile (Chen & Findlay, 2003), Latin 
America (Chari et al., 2010) and Indonesia (Song, Kueh, Abdul Rahman, & Chu, 
2010b). Chen and Findlay (2003) claimed that the number of firms available for 
sale increase following privatisation, while Chari et al. (2010) states that the 
privatised firms seek foreign investors, thus positively affecting CBMA inflow.  
 
 Additionally, CBMA inflow increased following the liberalisation of 
trade and investment, the deregulation of the service sector, the relaxation of 
control over CBMAs (Chen & Findlay, 2003) and deregulation of capital market 
(Chari et al., 2010). Consistent with previous argument, strict regulatory 
environment such as complicated and lengthy administration process involving 
various regulatory bodies (Song et al., 2010b), financial restriction on capital 
outflow from a home country (Jongwanich et al., 2013) and high corporate tax 
rate (Nagano, 2013) hampered CBMAs.  
 
 Martynova and Renneboog (2008) claimed that the governance 
environment of a country is an important stimuli of CBMAs. Their argument was 
based on corporate governance spillover hypothesis (positive spillover and 
bootstrapping). First, Martynova and Renneboog (2008) claimed that most 
bidders were from country with strong corporate governance and their study 
supported positive spillover hypothesis where bidders' strong corporate 
governance will result in target corporate governance improvement. This 
contention was corroborated by studies conducted by Chen et al. (2009) and Erel, 
Liao and Weisbach (2012) who found that the likelihood of CBMA outflow from 
a home country increased with strong governance standards. This positive 
spillover hypothesis also suggested that target firms were from country with 
weak corporate governance standard. This was supported by Martynova and 
Renneboog (2008), Alba et al. (2009) and Bae, Chang and Kim (2013) who 
found that weak corporate governance standard in target country increased 
CBMA inflow. Alba et al. (2009) suggested that weak corporate governance of 
target country implied room for improvement through CBMAs.  
 
 In contrast, Martynova and Renneboog (2008) suggested that it was also 
possible that the bidders were from country with weak corporate governance. 
These firms were involved in CBMAs to bootstrap themselves to a better 
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corporate governance standard by acquiring firms from a country with stronger 
governance standards. This bootstrapping hypothesis implied that the target 
country should have strong corporate governance standards. Martynova and 
Renneboog (2008) confirmed the bootstrapping hypothesis and it was supported 
by recent study by Hur et al. (2011), Nagano (2013) and Lebedev et al. (2015) 
who found that strong corporate governance standard in target country attracted 
more CBMA inflow. 
 
 Another important country-specific antecedent of CBMA transaction is 
the depreciation of target currency relative to bidder because it resulted in 
upsurge in the relative wealth of the foreign firms (Alba et al., 2009) and reduced 
the cost of capital transfer (Jongwanich et al., 2013). This contention was 
supported by Erel et al. (2012) and Georgopoulos (2014) who discovered that 
depreciation of target currency relative to bidder positively affected the CBMA 
ratio by the bidder.  
 
 Geographic proximity also plays an important role as antecedent of 
CBMAs. Ferreira et al. (2010) found high CBMA activity between countries in 
the same geographic region. Similarly, Erel et al. (2012), Jongwanich et al. 
(2013) and Lebedev et al. (2015) also reported that geographic proximity 
between target and bidding country increased CBMAs because greater distance 
between target and bidder complicate foreign operation and increase supervision 
cost (Jongwanich et al., 2013).  
 
 Another motive of CBMAs was related to Eclectic Paradigm, as 
indicated by Dunning (1980) which is internalisation of resources because they 
were costly to acquire due to inefficient market transaction (Harris & 
Ravenscraft, 1991). Chen and Findlay (2003) also denoted that internalisation of 
resources of foreign company through CBMA was faster than setting up a new 
operation in foreign country. Among the resources a bidder seek to internalize are 
firm's ownership-specific advantages such as financial, technological, 
informational or organisational (Gonzalez et al., 1997), raw material, distribution 
channels, equipment and machinery and brand capital (Changqi & Ningling, 
2010; Popli & Sinha, 2014), patent (Deng & Yang, 2015; Jongwanich et al., 
2013) and also low labour cost (Nagano, 2013). Therefore, a resource-rich 
country will pull CBMA bidder to the country. 
 
 Lebedev et al. (2015) claimed that uncertainty and less established 
institution in emerging countries required bidder to have networking and 
managerial ties with the governement officials for CBMAs. Even though firms 
from emerging countries have no technological or managerial advantage, the 
bidder would acquire the target to establish  network or political ties in the host 
country, and this is consistent with the theory of Brownfield acquisitions 
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(Lebedev et al., 2015). Brownfield acquisition occurred when bidder seek 
resources unique to the firms such as political ties even though the firms lack of 
technological or managerial competence (Estrin & Meyer, 2011). In addition, 
Lebedev et al. (2015) claimed that most acquisition by emerging country firms 
are driven by national hubris or pride due to high premium paid when they 
acquired the target in developed countries. 
 
 Emerging country CBMA players such as ASEAN countries might have 
different antecedents or motivations which drove their involvement in CBMAs. 
Therefore, the following section will highlight how the CBMA trends by six 
ASEAN countries discussed in overview of CBMA by six top ASEAN country 
players (both target and bidding firms) section can be used to anticipate the 
antecedents or motivation for CBMAs for the member countries.  
 
Antecedents unique to ASEAN countries  
 
One of the CBMA antecedents discussed for emerging countries was the 
corporate governance spillover hypothesis. Referring to the top five bidders of six 
ASEAN countries in Table 3, majority of the bidders were from country with 
better governance score as indicated in Table 8. Therefore, it is anticipated that 
positive spillover hypothesis will be applicable to CBMAs targeting ASEAN 
firms. For example, top bidders for firms from Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand 
were Singaporean firms whose corporate governance score (1.50) is higher than 
target country firms (Indonesia: –0.57, Malaysia: 0.38 and Thailand: –0.18). 
Firms from the Philippines and Vietnam were also acquired by firms from 
countries with higher corporate governance score such as the United States and 
Japan. However, the trend is the opposite for Singapore, where Table 3 shows 
that only one of its top bidders which is Australia, has higher corporate 
governance score. This trend suggested that Singaporean firms were acquired 
because the bidders were trying to bootstrap their firms to a higher governance 
standards by acquiring firms from country with high governance standards. 
Therefore, it is anticipated that firms in ASEAN countries were acquired to 
improve targets' governance standards as suggested by Martynova and 
Renneboog (2008) and Alba et al. (2009) and also for bootstrapping purpose 
(Martynova & Renneboog, 2008). 
 
With regards to CBMAs by ASEAN bidding firms, Table 4 clearly 
indicated that firms from five out of six ASEAN countries, acquired firms from 
countries with better governance standards as shown in Table 8.  Even though 
Singaporean firms mostly acquired firms from countries with weaker governance 
standards, they also acquired Australian firms. As shown in Table 8, Australian 
firms had an average higher corporate governance score than Singapore. 
Therefore, this trend suggested that ASEAN firms were involved in CBMAs to 
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bootstrap themselves to a better governance standards as they acquired firms 
from countries with stronger governance standards.  
 
Table 8  
Corporate governance score (World governance indicator) 
 
 
  
Additionally, Table 8 indicated that six ASEAN member countries under review 
have a low corporate governance score except for Singapore. Nevertheless, these 
countries remained popular as CBMAs target in year 2014 even though there was 
a decline in worldwide FDI. Therefore, it is worthwhile to screen the firm-level 
antecedents. As in Table 6, on average the ROA for ASEAN target firms is 
higher than ROA for target firm acquired by ASEAN bidding firms for all 
countries except Vietnam. Thus, acquiring better performing target from ASEAN 
countries with weaker corporate governance is consistent with "cherry-picking" 
antecedents as suggested by Kim and Lu (2013) and Lebedev et al., (2015). Thus, 
firm's stronger financial position in ASEAN can pull foreign investor to acquire 
the firm.  
  
 Lebedev et al. (2015) also suggested that CBMA was conducted by firms 
from emerging countries as a result of national pride or hubris. Table 5 indicates 
that for CBMA by ASEAN bidder, Singapore, as the only developed country 
among the six ASEAN members did not pay high premium to acquire foreign 
target. This might be due to the fact that Singaporean firms mostly acquired firms 
from emerging countries. Therefore, national pride or hubris antecedent may not 
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be applicable for Singapore. Firms from the Philippines paid the highest average 
premium during CBMAs and its top four target nations were developed countries. 
Second highest average premium was paid by Indonesian firm and its top three 
target nations were also developed countries. To summarise, the trend of high 
premium paid for the acquisition of developed targets suggested the existence of 
national pride or hubris in CBMAs of some ASEAN firms. 
 
 
IMPACT OF CROSS-BORDER MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 
(CBMAs) 
 
Firm's Performance 
 
Market Return 
 
Almost all studies on the effect of CBMAs on firms' performance used event 
study methodology to measure the shareholders' wealth creation. Some studies 
focused on either bidder or target firm return and very few focused on combined 
returns.  
 
 Similar to domestic M&A, target shareholders in CBMAs gained for all 
event windows examined in the studies (Ahouansou, 2010; Bris & Cabolis, 2008; 
Ferreira et al., 2010; Goergen & Renneboog, 2004; Harris & Ravenscraft, 1991; 
Martynova & Renneboog, 2008; Zhu & Jog, 2012). In addition, the target 
shareholders gain regardless of target country market development level, whether 
it is developed market (Ferreira et al., 2010; Goergen & Renneboog, 2004; 
Martynova & Renneboog, 2008) or emerging market (Zhu & Jog, 2012). 
Therefore, there is conclusive evidence that target shareholder gained during 
CBMAs. 
 
 Short-term shareholder wealth effect for bidding shareholder in CBMA 
transaction is still inconclusive. Many studies found that announcement of 
CBMAs created wealth for bidders (Bhagat, Malhotra, & Zhu, 2011; Cakici, 
Hessel, & Tandon, 1996; Chari et al., 2010; Corhay & Rad, 2000; Goergen & 
Renneboog, 2004; Lowinski, Schiereck, & Thomas, 2004; Martynova & 
Renneboog, 2008; Masulis, Wang, & Xie, 2012; Mueller & Yurtoglu, 2007; 
Rani, Yadav, & Jain, 2014; Yang, 2015; Zhu & Jog, 2012). Though, there were a 
few studies claimed that bidding shareholder loss following CBMA 
announcement (Aybar & Ficici, 2009; Bris & Cabolis, 2008; Cakici et al., 1996; 
Corhay & Rad, 2000; Ferreira et al., 2010; Jory & Ngo, 2011; Mangold & 
Lippok, 2008).  
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For long-term market return, Basuil (2011) declared that CBMAs did not 
create value for bidder because the 12 months Buy-and-Hold Abnormal return 
(BHAR) was –8.49% but not statistically significant. Jory and Ngo (2011) who 
measured 36 month long run abnormal return found that bidder of government 
owned target experience significantly higher return than matching bidder with 
non-government owned target. 
 
 A few studies examined the combined return of both target and bidder. 
Ferreira et al. (2010) reported a significantly positive combined return of not 
more than 2% following CBMA announcements. Ahouansou (2010) examined 
the combined returns for four categories of sample categorised by target and 
bidder's market development level namely developed market (DM) or emerging 
market (EM). DM-EM sample represent developed market bidder acquired 
emerging market target. Ahouansou (2010) discovered that DM-EM sample and 
EM-DM sample generated significantly positive return for combined firms of 
1.51% and 18.08% respectively. However, combined return of DM-DM and EM-
EM sample were insignificant. Meanwhile, Zhu and Jog (2012) who examined 
CBMAs in emerging market during the year 1990 to 2007 found a significant 
positive combined return of 1.6%. Overall, even though bidders' return for 
CBMA transaction was not conclusive, a positive return for combined firm in the 
studies above indicated that synergy did materialise following CBMA 
transactions.   
 
Non-market return 
 
There were also studies which examined the effect of CBMA transactions on firm 
performance other than event studies. For instance, a study by Song et al. (2010b) 
examined target firms performance after CBMAs using Tobin's Q and found a 
slight improvement in firm performance following CBMAs.  
 
 Another popular measure used to examine the firm's performance after 
CBMA is Return on Asset (ROA). Both studies by Changqi and Ningling (2010) 
and Chari et al. (2010) reported that on average, there was no improvement on 
firm's ROA. However, recent studies by Jory and Ngo (2011) and Klimek (2014) 
reported a decline in firm's performance following CBMAs. 
 
 Apart from Tobin's Q and ROA, a study by Klimek (2014) also used 
sales revenue, gross profit and return on equity (ROE) to measure post CBMA 
bidders' performance. Bidders' sales revenue and gross profit rose following 
CBMA transaction but ROE did not improve. Another study by Song, Kueh, 
Abdul Rahman and Chu (2010a) used the excess free cash flow per share 
(EFCFS) to measure firm's performance and reported an improvement in EFCFS 
following CBMAs.   
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 Therefore, the use of non-market return as proxy for firm's performance 
did not result in conclusive evidence for firm's performance following CBMA 
transactions. 
 
Other Impacts 
 
Other than examining the impact of CBMAs on firm's performance, a study by 
Wang and Wong (2009) took different perspective by examining the impact of 
CBMAs on economic growth of a country. The author concluded that CBMAs 
promoted target country economic growth when sufficient level of human capital 
was achieved by the country. Another study by Zhu and Jog (2012) examined the 
impact of CBMAs on firm's risk. The result indicated that the risk of target firms 
over the years consistently decreased following CBMAs from –7.01 a year before 
CBMAs to –7.24 for three years after CBMAs. 
 
Anticipated Firm's Performance of ASEAN Countries 
 
Despite abundance of studies examined the impact of CBMA on firm's 
performance, only one study focused on ASEAN member countries as sample 
which is Rao-Nicholson, Salaber and Cao (2015). This study examined the long-
term combined return of ASEAN firms during CBMA including Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. They found that the combined 
firm's performance declined following CBMAs as there was a reduction in 
industry adjusted ROA following CBMAs from 1.6 (pre-CBMAs) to –0.33 (post-
CBMAs). The reduction of firm's performance in this study is consistent with the 
fact that there is fragmentation of Asian market in various aspects including 
cultural, language and economy (Punurai, 2014). Therefore, a deterioration of 
long-term performance of ASEAN firms following CBMA is anticipated as 
cultural and language factors are vital for post-CBMAs integration. 
 
 Since there is paucity of research on ASEAN countries and majority of 
ASEAN member countries are emerging countries, studies on short-term 
shareholder's wealth for emerging countries are referred to anticipate the short-
term shareholder's wealth of ASEAN member countries during CBMAs. As 
highlighted in firm's performance (market return) section, target shareholder of 
emerging countries gain during CBMAs (Zhu & Jog, 2012). For bidders, market 
rewards emerging countries (EC) bidder more than European bidders as EC 
bidders gain 1.72% (Bhagat et al., 2011) while European bidders only gain 0.47% 
(Martynova & Renneboog, 2008). Thus, positive short-term shareholders wealth 
for both target and bidder of emerging countries is anticipated to be applicable to 
emerging ASEAN countries. 
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DETERMINANTS OF FIRM PERFORMANCE 
 
Other than measuring the performance of firm following CBMA announcements, 
many studies made further analyses to determine the determinants of firms' 
performance. Among the frequently discussed determinants were firms-specific 
factors, deal characteristics factors and also country-specific factors.  
 
Firm-Specific Factors 
 
According to first mover advantage theory, a firm that move earlier in CBMA 
wave will be able to protect itself from competition as they already locked the 
critical asset, and it would be more prevalent for firms in R&D industry with high 
asset intangibility. Therefore, the success in preventing competition through 
CBMAs should materialise in firms' performance. For that reason, Harris and 
Ravenscraft (1991) discovered that target shareholder of R&D intensive business 
gained higher abnormal returns. In contrast, Cakici et al. (1996) found no 
significant relationship between R&D intensity and firm's performance. 
However, a later study by Chari et al. (2010) supported the contention made by 
Harris and Ravenscraft (1991) because they found that bidder gained more if it 
belongs to industry with high asset intangibility such as R&D.  
 
 Top management team or board of director of a firm played an important 
role in explaining the variation in firm performance during CBMA as the 
decision to be involved in CBMA is within their discretion. Agency theory 
suggests that if the interest of shareholders and managers are aligned, the firm 
would not suffer agency cost such as unprofitable CBMA. The first important 
management characteristic is having larger board (Basuil, 2011) because it can 
reduce agency cost through expanding the firm knowledge based and assessing 
potential target in CBMA with its wider pool of skills and abilities (Basuil, 
2011). Next characteristic is not having duality role of chairman and CEO as it 
would increase agency cost due to dominance of a single person in a firm, who 
would make unprofitable acquisition through CBMAs.  This argument is 
consistent with the theory of managerial hegemony which anticipated a weak 
board function when duality role exist. However, Basuil (2011) reported that 
duality role of chairman and CEO was the profitability driver for bidder returns 
during CBMAs, thus supporting stewardship theory.  
 
 In addition, not having a busy board (determined by number of 
directorship) would also increase shareholder's return as agent (director) are able 
to prevent the manager's empire building especially through CBMAs due to 
limited directorships held by them.  This was supported  by Masulis et al. (2012) 
that revealed busier board reduced bidder's return. Lastly, Masulis et al. (2012) 
also postulated the importance of having foreign independent director (FID) from 
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similar region as target firm to derive higher return for the bidder. This study 
argued on the basis of facilitation hypothesis whereby FID will act as facilitator 
in CBMA by utilising his or her local expertise to provide valuable advice which 
will result in better CBMA.  
 
 A few studies postulated that firm's size also affected shareholder wealth 
creation during CBMA. However, their finding were inconclusive. A few studies 
found no significant relationship between the size and abnormal return (Bhagat et 
al., 2011; Cakici et al., 1996; Corhay & Rad, 2000). However, others found a 
positive relationship between size and cumulative abnormal return of 
shareholders (Basuil, 2011; Du & Boateng, 2015; Song et al., 2010a). In contrast, 
Martynova and Renneboog (2008) found a negative effect of firm's size on the 
bidder's returns. They argued that the size of a bidder was a proxy for managerial 
hubris, thus would result in overpayment during CBMA transaction which 
negatively affected bidder's return.   
 
 Numerous studies examined the impact of various type of ownership on 
the shareholders' return. Firstly, Song et al. (2010a) indicated that the government 
or state ownership has no significant relationship with target return, thus 
proposed that variation in firm's performance was not explained by the 
government ownership. In contrast, other studies found positive effect of 
government or state ownership towards bidders' return (Changqi & Ningling, 
2010; Du & Boateng, 2015; Jory & Ngo, 2011; Lebedev et al., 2015). Changqi 
and Ningling (2010) and Du and Boateng (2015) who examined CBMAs by 
Chinese firms claimed that favourable effect of government ownership stemmed 
from strict supervision under high concentrated ownership, operation in 
monopoly industry and ability to enjoy favourable government policies such as 
low cost loan and tax rebate. Similarly, Lebedev et al. (2015) acknowledged that 
state ownership and bidders' performance was positively correlated. At the same 
time, Lebedev et al. (2015) also highlighted that studies of Chinese and Russian 
bidder experienced negative reaction by the capital market when there is 
involvement of government owned firm in CBMAs.   
 
 Next category of ownership widely scrutinised is foreign ownership. 
Ferreira et al. (2010) and Lebedev et al. (2015) indicated that foreign ownership 
resulted in improvement of post-acquisition performance. Their study endorsed 
the facilitation hypothesis where foreign institution shareholder help to reduce 
transaction cost and information asymmetry during CBMA deal. In contrast, 
Song et al. (2010a) who examined target returns affirmed that foreign ownership 
adversely affect firm's performance. Family ownership also contributed to 
positive wealth creation during CBMAs (Song et al., 2010a) because they have 
more incentive to ensure that the firm was properly operated. Lastly, a newly 
privatised firm can also be a significant contributor to shareholders' wealth during 
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CBMAs. Lebedev et al. (2015) claimed that CBMAs will facilitate the 
transformation process of newly privatised firm and consequently improve the 
performance of the target firm.  
 
Grounded on organisational learning theory and theory of absorptive 
capacity, firm with long history should have high adaptive ability especially for 
firm's reform during CBMAs because it should have been experiencing many 
changes. An early study by Changqi and Ningling (2010) found no significant 
association firm's age and shareholder's return but a later study by Rahim, 
Ahmad, Ahmad and Rahim (2013) confirmed the organisational learning theory 
argument as they found a significant positive relationship between firm's age and 
bidders' return.  
 
In contrast with organisational learning theory, Cakici et al. (1996) 
hypothesised that bidder with low overseas exposure should have larger gain 
when they embark in CBMAs. However their result showed no significant 
relationship between overseas exposure and bidder's return. A later study by 
Corhay and Rad (2000) confirmed the hypothesis by Cakici et al. (1996) thus, 
acknowledged the fact that the market was less appreciative towards CBMAs if 
the firms already have a strong presence in the international market. 
 
Firms' financial advantages were also discussed as a significant 
contributor to the firm performance during CBMAs. Changqi and Ningling 
(2010) examined the impact of pre-acquisition free cash flow on acquires' return 
and found a negative but insignificant relationship. Therefore, they argued that 
large pre-acquisition cash flow will not remain "free" as large amount of cash 
was utilised for post-CBMA integration process. Pre-acquisition stock price was 
also discussed as one of the financial advantage that affected shareholders' wealth 
(Martynova & Renneboog, 2008). A good pre-acquisition firm's performance 
would also positively affect post-CBMA performance because it portrayed that a 
firm is managed efficiently and the efficiency will continue in the combined firm 
(Changqi & Ningling, 2010). In addition, it would expedite bidders to gain 
expertise in new market (Song et al., 2010a). In contrast, Du and Boateng (2015) 
claimed that a firm with high profitability negatively affect bidder's return 
because of possibility of manager to invest in value-decreasing CBMAs. 
 
According to Aybar and Thanakijsombat (2015), acquiring firms with 
low level of investment opportunity generate higher return during CBMAs than 
firm with higher level of investment opportunity. They claimed that CBMA 
announcement by firm with low level of investment opportunity less likely to 
occur. Therefore, market react positively to the unexpected announcement of 
CBMA by the firms.   
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Deal Characteristic Factors 
 
Next main elements discussed as contributor to the shareholder wealth creation 
was the deal characteristic. According to Lowinski et al. (2004), more wealth was 
created when the transaction size was large. This was due to ability of firms to 
achieve economies of scale (Aybar & Ficici, 2009) and less intense competition 
for large target firm (Aybar & Thanakijsombat, 2015). In contrast, Bhagat et al. 
(2011) who examined the effect of transaction size on bidder's return, found a 
negative impact of transaction value on bidder's return. 
 
Lowinski et al. (2004) also examined whether the existence of renown 
advisor in CBMA transactions improve shareholders' wealth. However, the result 
indicated that no additional value was created in a transaction where leading 
advisors was included. Among the explanations given were, the cost associated 
with appointing an advisor outweigh the benefit, and advisors were appointed 
only for complex CBMA transactions. 
 
An earlier study by Corhay and Rad (2000) stated that diversification 
dominated the synergy and this was supported by a later study by Song et al. 
(2010a), Aybar and Ficici (2009) and Jory and Ngo (2011). They argued that 
foreign diversified acquisition was a move to complement the firms' 
competencies and operation, and also resources can be allocated more efficiently, 
thus created value for CBMAs. At the same time, Song et al. (2010a) also 
claimed that relatedness of a business enabled a firm to gain synergistic effect.  In 
contrast to the studies above, Lowinski et al. (2004), Chari et al. (2010) and 
Bhagat et al. (2011) did not find any significant relationship between relatedness 
and abnormal return.  
 
The acquisition type, whether a transaction was friendly or hostile, was 
also said to have impact on shareholder's wealth. Similar to domestic M&A, 
target shareholder gained in hostile CBMAs (Martynova & Renneboog, 2008) 
while bidder shareholder suffered a loss (Cakici et al., 1996; Martynova & 
Renneboog, 2008). Bidder shareholders feared that hostile acquisition would 
resulted in higher premium paid to target firm, thus penalised the hostile 
acquisition. However, anomalous finding was discovered by Masulis et al. (2012) 
because they reported a significantly higher bidders' return in hostile transaction.   
 
Methods of payment during acquisition, either cash or stock payment 
also affected shareholders return. Numerous studies (Chari et al., 2010; 
Martynova & Renneboog, 2008; Masulis et al., 2012) discovered that stock 
payment resulted in lower shareholders return due to signalling effect that 
bidders' stock was overvalued. Consistently, a study by Du and Boateng (2015) 
found a positive effect of cash payment on bidder's return. Aybar and 
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Thanakijsombat (2015) further examined the source of CBMA financing instead 
of merely considered the methods of payments. They reported a significantly 
higher return for bidder that used debt to finance CBMA transaction compared to 
internally financed acquisition due to monitoring role of creditors.  
 
In CBMA, it is important to have sufficient holdings in target firm 
because CBMAs involved a combination of two firms from different countries 
and culture. Therefore, sufficient control in target would expedite the post-
CBMA integration process. For instance, Chari et al. (2010) and Yang (2015) 
reported higher bidders' gain with higher ownership following acquisition. 
However, Martynova and Renneboog (2008) and Rani et al. (2014) claimed that 
partial or majority post-acquisition ownership is not sufficient to create 
shareholders' wealth because in CBMAs, there was information asymmetry and 
cultural barriers between target and bidder. Therefore, a full control of target firm 
was a pre-requisite for the post-acquisition integration process.  
 
Listing status of target firms also seem to be able to explain bidders' 
return. For instance, Aybar and Ficici (2009) and Masulis et al. (2012) found a 
lower return for bidder of public target because of higher premium paid to satisfy 
the interest of diverse group of shareholders as a result of ownership structure 
complexity of the public firm (Aybar & Ficici, 2009). This was supported by Bae 
et al. (2013) who reported that private target resulted in higher abnormal return to 
bidder than public target.  
  
Country-Specific Factors 
 
The corporate governance standard of a country not only affect the intensity of 
CBMA inflow and outflow, but it also affects shareholder wealth creation during 
CBMAs. As highlighted in antecedents (country-specific factors) section, 
positive spillover hypothesis influenced CBMA intensity because it can improve 
target's corporate governance standard (Martynova & Renneboog, 2008). 
Consequently, the improvement of target's corporate governance standard 
resulted in higher wealth creation for target and bidder. This was supported by 
Chari et al. (2010), Ahouansou (2010), Jory and Ngo (2011), Basuil (2011) and 
Yen, Chou and André (2013). The improvement of target's corporate governance 
standard was the result of sharing good corporate governance practice such as 
legal and accounting standard with the target firm (Chari et al., 2010). In 
addition, higher return was achieved because bidders exploited target's 
governance imperfection to their advantage (Jory & Ngo, 2011) and also due to 
low premium paid to target firm as a penalty  for target weak accounting 
standards (Bris & Cabolis, 2008). 
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On top of that, bootstrapping hypothesis which induce CBMA outflow of 
bidder from weak corporate governance standard to target from country with 
stronger corporate governance standard ultimately resulted in higher gain during 
CBMA transaction (Bhagat et al., 2011; Martynova & Renneboog, 2008). This is 
due to the improvement of bidders' corporate governance standard because they 
have to adhere to target higher governance standards. In contrast, Mangold and 
Lippok (2008) reported a significantly lower return for bidder that acquire target 
with high corporate governance standards. Thus, they argued that the lower return 
was the result of higher premium paid to the target in more developed country as 
developed country would demand a higher premium to compensate the increased 
risk exposure due to inferior governance of bidder (Starks & Wei, 2013). 
 
Post-CBMA integration is vital for a successful CBMAs, thus resulted in 
shareholder wealth creation. Among the factors that can expedite post-CBMA 
integration are geographic proximity of target and bidder (Martynova & 
Renneboog, 2008),  having foreign independent director whose origin was similar 
to target home country (Masulis et al., 2012) and having small cultural distance 
(Aybar & Ficici, 2009; Basuil, 2011). In contrast, Aybar and Thanakijsombat 
(2015) claimed that acquiring a target with high cultural distance is also 
advantageous because it increase bidders' ability to learn from the difference and 
enlarge their knowledge base. However, cultural distance did not explain the 
variation in Chinese bidders' return (Du & Boateng, 2015) because their Western-
educated top management and the technological advancement played substantial 
role in bridging the cultural gap between target foreign countries and China. 
 
In addition, the difference in market development level between target 
and bidder also affected the shareholder wealth creation in CBMAs. Ahouansou 
(2010) and Chari et al. (2010) found that cross-market CBMAs (DM-EM and 
EM-DM) generated higher abnormal return than CBMAs where both the target 
and bidder were from similar level of markets development. This was supported 
by Du and Boateng (2015) who claimed that the existence of institutional 
distance (difference in market development) implied a high possibility of 
resources and capability complementary.  
 
Regulatory environment of the country also become the centre of 
discussion as one of the determinants of performance during CBMAs. For 
instance, the favourable tax reform in the US in year 1986 was expected to 
improve shareholders' return during CBMAs. However, Cakici et al. (1996) 
found no significant impact of the 1986 tax reform on bidders' return. Meanwhile, 
Rahim et al. (2013) who examined the determinants of Malaysian CBMAs found 
a significant negative effect of tax and bidders' return. Du and Boateng (2015) 
who examined the value creation of Chinese CBMAs reported a favourable effect 
of exchange rate reform on bidder's return. They argued that the positive effect 
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was stemmed from reduction of bureaucracy following liberalisation of exchange 
rate approval procedure which ultimately reducing CBMA costs. 
 
Aybar and Thanakijsombat (2015) took a different perspective by 
examining the impact of country relative risk on bidder's return. They reported a 
higher bidder return when entering a higher risk target country because market 
expected higher benefits would accrue to offset the expansion into higher risk 
economies.  
 
Emerging countries of CBMA players such as ASEAN countries might 
have different determinants for their performance during CBMAs. Therefore, the 
following section will highlight how the CBMA trends by the six ASEAN 
countries discussed in overview of CBMA by six top ASEAN country players 
(both target and bidding firms) section can be used to anticipate the determinants 
of CBMA performance for these countries.  
 
Determinants Unique to ASEAN Countries 
 
With regard to firm-specific factors, Figure 7 shows a minimal involvement of 
government owned firm in CBMA by ASEAN firm. It might signify that ASEAN 
firms did not enjoy any favourable government policies as Chinese firms such as 
low cost loan and tax rebate (Du & Boateng, 2015). Thus, government ownership 
factors might not explain the variation in ASEAN firm's performance during 
CBMAs. However, since ASEAN target firms have financial advantage prior to 
acquisition, as portrayed in Table 6, it is expected that this trend would continue 
in the combined firm as suggested by Changqi and Ningling (2010). Therefore, it 
is anticipated that ASEAN firm's financial advantage may explain firms' 
performance during CBMAs. 
 
 Determinants of firm's performance (deal characteristic factors) section 
present a lot of factors that affect firm's performance during CBMAs. For 
ASEAN target firms, more related acquisition than diversified acquisition was 
reported in Figure 9. This implied that in a country with high risk (low 
governance standards, as shown in Table 8) like ASEAN countries, less risky 
related acquisitions are preferred by bidding firms. This might be due to the fact 
that this acquisition type may lead to higher return because synergy would 
materialise, as suggested by Song et al. (2010a). In addition, as there is high 
information asymmetry and cultural barriers between target and bidder in 
CBMAs, full acquisition would ease the post-CBMA integration and improve 
firm's performance (Martynova & Renneboog, 2008; Rani et al., 2014). In the 
context of ASEAN firms, it is anticipated that full acquisition may explain the 
variation in firm's performance during CBMA as almost half of CBMA by 
ASEAN firms (46% of bidder and 41% of target) are full acquisition, as shown in 
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Table 7. Figure 8 indicates that shares payment was rarely chosen as 
consideration paid or received by ASEAN firms. This might be due to signalling 
effect as highlighted in previous section. Thus, there is possibility that 
consideration structure may explain ASEAN firm's performance following 
CBMAs.   
 
 Section on antecedents (motivations) of CBMAs highlight that ASEAN 
firms CBMA may be explained by the corporate governance spillover hypothesis. 
A firm would normally choose CBMAs if it was assured that CBMAs would 
improve shareholders wealth, as suggested by shareholder wealth maximization 
theory of M&A. Therefore, the positive spillover hypothesis would be anticipated 
to explain the shareholder wealth creation for Singaporean bidding firms, because 
their top target firms came from countries with low corporate governance as 
shown in Table 8. For other countries in ASEAN, their top targets firms were 
from countries with higher governance score. Thus, bootstrapping hypothesis is 
anticipated to explain the variation in ASEAN firms' shareholders wealth. 
Furthermore, for bootstrapping to take place, only partial acquisition would be 
applicable to ensure that target firms are still listed on host country stock 
exchange. Panel A of Table 7 shows total number of minority and majority 
CBMAs by ASEAN bidding firms exceeded full acquisition, thus enable 
bootstrapping of governance standards for CBMAs by ASEAN bidding firms.  
 
 In addition, previous studies also suggested that differences in market 
development level can also explain the variation in firms' performance during 
CBMAs. Table 9 indicated top bidder and top target nation are from countries 
with different development level than from the firm's country origin. Therefore, it 
is anticipated that differences in market development level could explain the 
variation in firms' performance following CBMAs by ASEAN firms. 
 
Table 9  
MSCI market development level 
 
Nationality 
of ASEAN 
Firms 
Market 
Development 
Level 
Top 
Bidder 
Nation 
Market 
Development 
Level 
Top 
Target 
Nation 
Market 
Development 
Level 
Indonesia Emerging Singapore Developed Singapore Developed 
Malaysia Emerging Singapore Developed Singapore Developed 
Philippines Emerging United States Developed 
United 
States Developed 
Singapore Developed Malaysia Emerging China Emerging 
Thailand Emerging Singapore Developed Singapore Developed 
Vietnam Frontier Japan Developed United States Developed 
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CONCLUSION 
 
The CBMA trends involving ASEAN countries is likely to continue in line with 
the contention made by Metwalli and Tang (2009) that numerous bilateral and 
regional free trade agreements involving ASEAN countries would spur CBMA 
expansion in Southeast Asia. In fact, the decline in world FDI seems to have no 
impact on FDI flow to and from ASEAN countries. This paper reviewed the 
CBMA trends involving firms from ASEAN member countries from January 
2002 to December 2014. The unique composition of ASEAN countries with 
different level of market development i.e., developed (Singapore), emerging 
(Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand) and frontier (Vietnam), preclude the 
applicability of specific CBMA literature from either developed or emerging 
countries. Here, the main research streams on CBMAs (from both developed and 
emerging countries) related to antecedents (motivation), impact and determinants 
of firm performance was discussed. This paper further analyse the CBMA trends 
by ASEAN member countries and anticipate the possible antecedent and 
determinant of firm performance unique to firms from this region. Based on the 
review, it is anticipated that CBMAs involving ASEAN countries can be 
explained by corporate governance spillover hypothesis, strong financial 
advantage and national pride or hubris. It is also anticipated that ASEAN firm 
would gain in short-term but loss in long-term following CBMAs. For the 
determinants, again, corporate governance spillover hypothesis might explain the 
variation in ASEAN firms' performance following CBMAs. Furthermore, the 
difference in market development level is also expected to contribute to ASEAN 
firms' wealth creation. Further statistical analysis is however required to verify 
the applicability of the anticipated antecedents, firm's performance and 
determinants of firm performance for ASEAN member countries.  
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